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ABSTRACT 
Increased pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) has gotten the attention of the 
international community, and many countries are engaged in counter-piracy operations to 
protect vulnerable shipping and provide humanitarian aid. In February 2009, the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) was established in order to 
introduce safer and more organized passage for all merchant vessels transiting the GOA. 
This thesis uses simulation to identify the key factors involved in escorting vulnerable 
shipping through the Gulf of Aden (GOA). Specifically, a scenario in which a group of 
merchant ships travels under escort of a warship is modeled using an agent-based 
simulation environment. Using state-of-the-art experimental designs, over 300,000 
counter-piracy escort missions are simulated and analyzed. The results indicate that 
convoys are most successful when they contain fewer than 14 merchant ships, travel at 
speeds greater than 18 knots, position the warship in front or on the flank of the convoy, 
and identify pirates at a range of no less than 4 kilometers. It is found that three or more 
pirate vessels are especially difficult to counter, as are pirates travelling at speeds greater 
than 39 knots. 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within 
the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logical 
errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without 
additional verification is at the risk of the user. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Increased pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) has gotten the attention of the 
international community, and many countries are engaged in counter-piracy operations to 
protect vulnerable shipping and provide humanitarian aid. The European Union Naval 
Force (EUNAVFOR) Somalia—Operation ATALANTA, is the European Union’s first 
naval operation. In February 2009, the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor 
(IRTC) was established in order to introduce safer and more organized passage for all 
merchant vessels transiting the GOA. The IRTC is a corridor between Somalia and 
Yemen within international waters, consisting of two lanes, each of five nautical miles 
(nm’s) width, one eastbound and one westbound, with a space of two nm between them. 
The total length of the transit corridor is 480 nm, and a vessel maintaining 14 knots 
requires 34.5 hours to pass through it. 
This thesis uses simulation to identify the key factors involved in escorting 
vulnerable shipping through the Gulf of Aden (GOA). Specifically, a scenario in which a 
group of merchant ships travels under escort of a warship is modeled using an agent-
based simulation environment known as Map-Aware, Non-uniform Automata (MANA). 
The simulation is run to address the following questions: 
 How does the number of merchant ships affect the ability of the frigate to 
defend them? 
 How many pirates can a convoy adequately handle? 
 What factors should be taken under consideration when we have an 
escorted convoy? 
We provide insight into the critical factors and threshold values a decision maker 
should consider when deciding how many merchant ships a warship should escort and 
what tactics should be used. 
The scenario simulated in MANA, shown in Figure 1, involves coalition force 
operations using a warship with a helicopter to protect a convoy of merchant ships 
transiting westbound in two columns along the IRTC. This area usually includes many 
fishing or other individual traveling vessels, and the pirates behave like one of them until 
they approach a potential target, attack it, and attempt to capture it. 
 xviii 
 
Figure 1.   Map of the Scenario 
Using state-of-the-art design of experiments (DOE), over 300,000 convoy 
operations are simulated. The DOE distinguishes between decision factors (i.e., those 
variables that we can control) and noise factors (those variables we cannot control), and 
varies the following:  
 Decision factors: warship position, convoy speed, number of merchant 
ships, distance between merchant ships, and helicopter takeoff delay 
 Noise factors: number of pirates, pirate speed, communication latency 
between merchant ships and warship, and distance from convoy at which 
pirates reveal identity 
Three primary analysis techniques are used to quantify how mean merchant (blue) 
casualties are affected by the factors above: multiple-regression analysis, robust analysis, 
and classification and regression trees. The analysis finds that in the scenario modeled:  
 xix 
 The three most influential factors in the regression analysis are the number 
of pirates, pirate speed, and convoy speed, 
 The most successful convoys have fewer than 14 merchant ships and 
travel at greater than 18 knots, 
 The warship should patrol in front or on the flank of the convoy, 
 It is important to be able to identify pirates at 4 kilometers from their 
target, 
 More than three pirate vessels are especially difficult to counter, as are 
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Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. 
       Albert Einstein 
A. WHAT IS PIRACY? 
The word pirate derives from the Greek ―peirates‖ (πειρατής), the name of an 
ancient adventurer who attacked a ship (Johnson & Valencia, 2005). Most people think of 
pirates as belonging to a very long-distant era, from approximately 1500 to 1800, when 
the Barbary corsairs of North Africa made the Mediterranean Sea rampant with piracy 
(Berlatsky, 2010). In Southeast Asia, piracy has been present for approximately 2,000 
years, but incidents have increased dramatically in the last two decades (Young, 2007). 
That augmented pirate activity has alarmed the international community, and many 
countries are engaged in counter-piracy operations to protect vulnerable shipping and 
humanitarian aid. 
In 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
provided a framework for the repression of piracy under international law. In particular, 
Article 101 defines piracy as follows: 
Article 101 
Definition of piracy 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
  (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
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(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft 
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b) (Young, 2007). 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The author found two related studies addressing maritime counter-piracy using 
agent-based simulations. 
The first was in 2005, by Walton and others (Walton, Paulo, McCarthy, & 
Vaidyanathan, 2005). Their research was part of a larger study that examined maritime-
domain protection in the Straits of Malacca. The scenario involved the attack of a small 
boat carrying explosives against a larger, high-value commercial ship, and was designed 
to demonstrate the quick reaction of the maritime-protection system. The scenario was 
developed in the simulation software MANA (Map Aware, Non-uniform Automata) and 
had either patrol crafts conducting a continuous patrol pattern in the straits or armed sea 
marshals aboard the commercial ship. The research examined ways to prevent the success 
of the small-boat attack when it exited from a fairly narrow portion of the straits that is 
usually congested. 
The second study was in 2010, conducted by Decraene and others (Decraene, 
Anderson, & Yoke Hean Low, 2010). The scenario was a large commercial vessel 
transiting a wide expanse of water, when a pirate agent closes on it. The commercial ship 
employs evasive maneuvers and a non-lethal weapon. Decraene and Anderson’s model 
was developed in MANA to investigate the requirements for a large commercial vessel 
using non-lethal deterrents to defend against hijacking. 
Both scenarios are dealing with maritime vessel protection, the first is using either 
crafts patrolling congested straits or armed personnel aboard the vessels under protection, 
while the second is using self-defense deterrents. This thesis evaluates a scenario using an 
escort warship and a helicopter. All three of these theses used the MANA simulation 
environment. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this thesis is to simulate counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden 
(GOA) and explore the benefits of escorting vulnerable shipping. This is done by 
simulating a scenario in which a group of merchant ships travels under escort of a 
warship. The simulation is run to address the following questions: 
 How does the number of merchant ships impact the ability of the frigate to 
defend them? 
 How many pirates can the convoy adequately handle? 
 What factors should be taken under consideration when we have an 
escorted convoy? 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study provides insight into critical factors and their threshold values for 
decision makers to take under consideration in determining how many merchant ships a 
warship can escort and what scheme should be followed. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The scenario described is modeled using the MANA modeling environment. 
The principles of robust design are used for the experiment. This research also 
makes use of the newest developments in Nearly Orthogonal Nearly Balanced Mixed 
designs (NONBMD). 
Two Nearly Orthogonal, Nearly Balanced, Mixed designs, one for decision 
factors and one for noise factors, are generated and crossed to produce the overall 
experiment design. 
The experiment is performed on the SEED Center’s high-performance cluster, 
―Reaper.‖ The xstudy, OldMcData, and Condor software packages are used to generate 
the required files and manage the execution of distributed jobs. 
To analyze the output of the experiment, the following methods are used: 
statistical summaries, multiple regression, partition trees, plots/graphs, and robust 
analysis. 
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F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II offers an outline of piracy in the GOA and a description of the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). The chapter ends with a 
description of the European Union Naval Force mission in the GOA. Chapter III begins 
with an overview of the modeling tool MANA and the scenario description and closes 
with a detailed description of the model and the way it is built. Chapter IV includes a 
discussion of experiment design, a description of the variables used in the analysis, and 
an explanation of NONBMD. Chapter V describes the analytical methods used to 
interpret the results of the simulated tests and concludes with an explanation of the 




A. THE HORN OF AFRICA AND GULF OF ADEN 
The Horn of Africa (Figure 2), a peninsula in East Africa, is a region comprising 
the countries of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia and is laved by the south part of 
the Red Sea and the GOA (Stock, 2004). 
The Horn of Africa is one of the most strategically important international 
waterways. It carries almost the 95% of European Union (EU) trade (by volume) 
transported by sea and 20% of global trade (EUNAVFOR, 2010). 
Piracy and absence of the rule of law in war-torn Somalia are directly linked. In 
the early 21
st
 century, when the second phase of the Somali civil war began, piracy off 
the long coastline of Somalia began to be a threat to international shipping. The lack of a 
substantial government, the disintegration of the Somali armed forces, and the possibility 
of gaining quick wealth through ransom caused a rapid increase in pirate attacks and 
armed robbery in the GOA and the Somali Basin region (SBR) (UN Chronicle, n.d.). 
Some observers also allege that illegal over-fishing of the Somalian waters by 
foreign poachers and the dumping of toxic waste have motivated some Somali groups 
engaged in piracy (Berlatsky, 2010). Big trawlers taking advantage of the lack of 
Somalian authority were illegally fishing vast amounts of sea life, estimated at $300 
million’s worth, leaving local fishermen with empty nets (Merchant, 2009). Also, it is 
hinted that a large amount of nuclear waste, including lead, cadmium, and mercury has 
been dumped in Somalian waters by other nations and individuals. This is allegedly 
contributing to the radical decrease in sea life (Hari, 2009). Early on, Somali fishermen 
started demanding that poachers pay fines, giving their groups names such as the 
National Volunteer Coast Guard of Somalia or Somali Marines. Later, they realized there 




Figure 2.   Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden (From Herff Jones Nystrom, 2010) 
B. PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN 
The augmented commercial traffic that passes through the straits is one of the 
main reasons for the increase in contemporary piracy. The low speed required for safe 
passage through these maritime choke points makes them vulnerable and easy targets 
(Chalk, 2008). The GOA is one of these choke points. 
The GOA and area surrounding the Horn of Africa are the most dangerous areas 
for piracy in the world. The pirates are opportunity-driven individuals, divided into clans 
and based in mobile port towns, with varying patterns of operation and capabilities 
(Nelson, 2010). They are usually divided into groups of about ten people and use small, 
high-speed skiffs towed by a dhow, pretending to be fishermen. The skiffs are usually in 
very poor condition, old, made of wood or fiberglass, and powered by outboard motors; 
the GOA’s calm seas allow the use of such vessels. The pirates are equipped with 
drinking water, gasoline, grappling hooks, short ladders, and fishing lines and nets. They 
carry a large variety of handheld small arms, including AK-47 rifles and rocket-propelled 
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grenades (RPGs) (Nelson, 2010) and (Kaplan, 2008). They venture out for a long period, 
usually three weeks, eating raw fish while waiting for their potential target. When they 
find it, they use ammunition firing to coerce the master of the vessel to either slow down 
or stop, and then climb aboard, making for the bridge to take control of the ship. After 
sailing to a safe harbor, they conduct negotiations for ransom while crew and cargo are 
held for weeks (Kaplan, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 3.   International Maritime Bureau Piracy Map for 2010 (From International 
Chamber of Commerce, 2010) 
C. INTERNATIONALLY RECOMMENDED TRANSIT CORRIDOR 
Shared Awareness and De-Confliction (SHADE) is a staff-level working group of 
officers from the various operational headquarters of all the alliances and individual 
countries conducting counter-piracy operations. One of the products of this group is the 
establishment of the IRTC (Nelson, 2010). In February 2009, the IRTC replaced the 
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previous Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) (Figure 4) in order to introduce safer 
and more organized passage for all merchant vessels transiting the GOA (Rietveld, 2009). 
The IRTC is a corridor between Somalia and Yemen within international waters, 
consisting of two lanes, each of five nautical miles (nm’s) width, one eastbound and one 
westbound, with a space of two nm between them. The total length of the transit corridor 
is 480 nm, and a vessel maintaining 14 knots requires 34.5 hours to pass through it. 
(North, 2010). 
Vessels that intend to pass through the IRTC are grouped according to transit 
speed. Groups of 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20 knots transit speed are formed at specific 
hours and dates, and traverse the IRTC under the coalition’s escort/convoy services 
(North, 2010). 
 




D. EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCE 
Due to the importance of the GOA as a critical conduit for international trade, 
military counter-piracy operations are conducted by naval ships from the Combined Task 
Force 150 (CTF-150), NATO Maritime Group (NMG), Russia (Russian Maritime 
Security Service (RMSS)), China, Japan (Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force 
(JMSDF)), and India. Some of these forces operate within alliances such as NATO and 
EU, some as part of the CTF, and some independently represent their nation’s interests. 
The European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) – Operation ATALANTA, is 
the European Union’s first naval operation, in support of resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 
(2008), 1838 (2008) and 1846 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council 
(EUNAVFOR, 2010). 
The area of operations of EUNAVFOR consists of the south Red Sea, the Gulf of 
Aden, and part of the Indian Ocean. This now includes the Seychelles, which makes the 
area as large as the Mediterranean Sea. 
The aim of operation ATALANTA is to contribute to: 
 The protection of the vessels of the World Food Program, humanitarian 
aid, and the African Union Military Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 
 The protection of vulnerable shipping, 
 The deterrence, prevention and repression of pirate activity and armed 
robbery, and 
 The monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. 
 In order to focus the scope of the operation, EUNAVFOR has been granted the 
authority to arrest, detain, and transfer persons who are suspected of, or who have 
committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery inside the area of operations. They can also 
seize the vessels of the pirates and the vessels hijacked by them, as well as the goods on 




Figure 5.   An Escorted WFP Ship (From http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/, 
2010) 
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. WHY MODELS ARE USEFUL 
The main purpose of models is to collect information and gain insight about some 
aspect of the real world. A model mimics or describes the behavior of the system being 
modeled (Sanchez P. J., 2007). Pedgen (1995) describes the use of models in simulation 
as ―[…] the purpose of understanding the behaviour of the system and/or evaluating 
various strategies for the operating system.‖ 
More specifically, models provide the ability to explore systems that cannot be 
disturbed because they are either sensitive or critical (Chung, 2004). Another benefit of 
the model is its ability to compress time. Systems that under normal conditions need a 
long time to be explored can effectively be shrunk. Also, in some cases, the cost of 
building a model is less expensive than experimenting directly with a real system 
(Sanchez P. J., 2007). 
There are two different but very closely connected levels of modeling. The first 
level is the simulation model itself; it is the model that describes the phenomena of 
interest. The subsequent level is a statistical model that is built to describe the 
simulation’s responses. The latter is a model of the model, and is often referred as a 
metamodel (Sanchez, Lucas, Sanchez, Nannini, & Wan, 2011, forthcoming). 
B. MAP-AWARE, NONUNIFORM AUTOMATA (MANA) 
1. Overview of MANA 
Many complex systems can be studied through the use of agent-based models. 
This kind of model provides useful insights into how individual interactions give rise to 
emergent properties like structures and causality. Agent-based modeling is a useful tool 
in simulation because it can explore phenomena that deal with interactions between 
individual agents, for example, people in a football stadium or ants searching for food 
(Berryman, 2008). 
The model chosen for this thesis is one such model: MANA, Version V. MANA 
is an agent-based, distillation-modeling environment, that is, it attempts to create models 
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that capture only the important factors in a situation and avoids explicitly all physical 
details (Horne & Schwierz, Data farming around the world overview, 2008). MANA was 
developed by the New Zealand Defense Technology Agency (DTA) for use as a 
scenario-exploring model and is designed to address a broad range of problems. It 
resulted from the frustrations DTA faced in analyzing the output of physics-based models 
available at the time, basically CAEn (Close Action Environment) and Janus. Although 
these models are detailed, highly physics based, and can predetermine the behavioral 
outcomes of agents, they are quite limited in analysis, basically because it is difficult to 
get the entities to behave in unscripted ways (McIntosh, Galligan, Anderson, & Lauren, 
2007). 
In MANA, a realistic scenario can be taken and a rough model quickly built. That 
is because MANA is not intended to describe every aspect of a military operation. Once 
the skeleton of the model has been built, one can easily change agent parameters and 
states in order to create a reasonably accurate model of the desired interactions. 
Two of MANA’s limitations are that is has not been designed to examine careful 
formation fighting, and entities do not always behave in a sensible manner (McIntosh, 
Galligan, Anderson, & Lauren, 2007). This is also the major advantage of MANA, 
meaning that the lack of a central, predetermined, decision-making algorithm for 
controlling entity behavior results in the agents making their own decisions as they adapt 
to the environment (Walton, Paulo, McCarthy, & Vaidyanathan, 2005). 
Finally, MANA is supplied with a built-in random-number generator using the 
Delphi function ―random.‖ The random-number generator has a cycle of 232 and 
maintains a 32-bit seed. This means that the result can take on approximately 4.3 x 10
9
 
values before repeating the cycle. 
2. Characteristics of MANA 
MANA was adopted from the ISAAC model, developed by the Center for Naval 
Analyses, in order to explore key concepts that the ISAAC model was not able to handle 
(McIntosh, Galligan, Anderson, & Lauren, 2007). Those concepts are: 
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 Situational awareness: MANA provides two types of situational 
awareness maps: a squad map that holds direct squad contacts and an 
inorganic map that stores contacts provided by other squads through 
communication links. 
 Communications: Allows squads to communicate with other squads in 
case of contact sightings. 
 Terrain map: Contains terrain features such as roads that can be followed 
by agents and underbrush that can be used as concealment. 
 Waypoints: Can define a set of waypoints, not merely the final goal. 
 Event-driven personality changes: Different events such as contact of an 
enemy can change the behavior of an agent or whole squad. The new 
behavior lasts for a user-specified period. 
MANA has a well-developed graphical user interface (GUI), and although it was 
originally developed to model land warfare, it can model alternative scenarios, such as 
sea based (McIntosh, Galligan, Anderson, & Lauren, 2007); see, for example, Abel 
(2009). 
C. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
1. Scenario Description 
As explained, the IRTC was established so that merchant or other vessels can 
assemble at specific points and transit as a group under the escort of coalition warships 
(Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6.   Warships Escorting Merchant Vessels in IRTC (After 
http://asianyachting.com/news/PirateCorridor.htm, 2011) 
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The scenario shown in Figure 7 takes place in the GOA and specifically in the 
IRTC. It simulates coalition operations to protect a convoy of merchant ships transiting 
westbound along the IRTC. Usually in the area there are also fishing or other individual 
traveling vessels, and the pirates behave like one of them until they approach a potential 
target. The scenario commences from the point that the pirates have reached high velocity 
heading towards the convoy. The pirates can be identified by one of the merchant ships or 
by the escorting warship. 
The merchant ships are sailing in two-column formation. As soon as one realizes 
it is being approached by a quickly moving, suspicious vessel, it signals the fleet, 
increases speed, and begins evasive tactics while the entire convoy flees. The warship, 
which may be sailing beside, before, or behind the merchant formation, increases speed 
and heads towards the merchant under attack. At the same time, orders are given for a 
helicopter to take off, which heads towards the provocation. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Map of the Scenario 
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2. Measure of Effectiveness 
As a measure of effectiveness (MOE), the mean merchant (blue) casualties are 
computed. This is easily assessed using JMP by summarizing over the number of blue 
casualties for each design point of the experiment. 
3. Scenario Assumptions  
Any scenario must have some assumptions if it is to be framed in terms of time 
and space. For the purpose of this study, the key assumptions are: 
 The pirate reveals his identity when he is close to the potential target. This 
proximity will always be within sensor range. Therefore, the quality of the 
sensors on the warship and the cargo ships has no impact on pirate 
detection. 
 The helicopter and the warship cannot be attacked or fired on by the 
pirates. 
 In the case of multiple pirates, either the helicopter or the warship will 
interdict the pirates by firing ammunition against them instead of trying to 
stop and arrest them. Thus, the helicopter or the warship can help in 
pursuing the other pirates. 
 In representing the capture of a merchant ship, the range of the pirate 
weapon is limited to 75 meters and the merchant needs to be shot twice. 
 The merchant ships are sailing in two-column formation. 
4. Model Description 
a. Battlefield 
The battlefield is a 20 × 20 nm snapshot of the IRTC. There are no 
battlefield restrictions, as the area is open sea. One model time-step is set to equal ten 
seconds. To configure the settings of the battlefield, the option Edit Battlefield has been 
used in the setup option in MANA’s menu bar. The battlefield settings of the scenario are 
shown in Figure 8. These settings are found on MANA’s Setup menu on the Edit 




Figure 8.   MANA Battlefield Settings  
b. Squads 
The squad is a key concept in MANA. A squad is a group of initially 
homogeneous agents given a size between 0 and 1000, as defined by the user. Table 1 






Squad # Unit Allegiance 
1 Warship 1 (BLUE) 
2 Merchant ships 1 (BLUE) 
3 Pirates 2 (RED) 
4 Helicopter 1 (BLUE) 
5 Fishermen 0 (NEUTRAL) 
Table 1.   Model Squads 
c. Warship 
The warship squad consists of a single agent. The agent’s personality 
weightings and different trigger states are shown in Figure 9. The personality weightings 
are defined using slide bars and may take on values from -100 to 100. A positive value 
indicates a positive propensity for the associated personality weighting, while a negative 
value indicates a negative propensity. Any propensity that has been changed from the 
default zero is shown in red. The warship, after contacting the pirates, has a propensity to 
move towards them (the Enemies weighting is set to 50). All other selections are at their 
default values. 
States that are being used for the warship (other than the default state), are 
Enemy Contact, for behavior when the warship contacts the pirates using its own sensors, 
Inorganic SA Enemy Contact 2, when the warship is notified by the merchants using 




Figure 9.   Warship Squad Properties 
The Inorganic SA panel controls the flow of situational awareness among 
squads by using communication links as conduits of information. The parameters of this 
panel do not vary within the squad’s different trigger states. The warship has 
communication links with the merchants and helicopter, as shown in Figure 10, Inorganic 




Figure 10.   Warship Inorganic SA Communications 
Each squad has up to four weapons available, and most of the parameters 
for the weapons are able to change within a trigger state. The warship has only one 
weapon, set to fire within a range of 250 meters and used to represent pirate deterrence. 
In the Protect Contact Type box, Self and Other Friends are selected to prevent the 
warship from firing against itself or the merchant ships. All other selections are at default 
values. The warship’s weapon adjustments are shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.   Warship Weapons 
d. Merchant Ships 
The merchant squad consists of eight agents. The agents’ personality 
weightings and different trigger states are shown in Figure 12. The merchants, after 
contact with the pirates, have a propensity to move away from them (the Enemies 
weighting is set to -30). All other selections are at their default values. 
The state used for the merchant ships, other than the default, is Enemy 




Figure 12.   Merchant Ships Squad Properties 
e. Pirates 
The pirate squad consists of one or more agent. Agent personality 
weightings and different trigger states are shown in 13. The pirates, after contact with the 
convoy, have a propensity to move towards the merchants (Enemy Threat 3 and Ideal 
Enemy weighting are set to 100) while avoiding the warship and helicopter (Enemy 
Threat 1 weighting set to -100). All other selections are at their defaults. 
Other than the default, the state used for the pirates is ―Enemy Contact 3,‖ 
for behavior after the pirates contact the convoy. 
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Figure 13.   Pirates Squad Properties 
The pirates, like the warship, have only one weapon. Their weapon is set 
to fire at a range of 75 meters, and is used to represent a merchant ship’s capture. Using 
the Fire on Targets in This Class Order input box, the pirates are assigned to fire against 
the merchant ships only, while the use of Non Target Classes keeps them from firing 
against the warship and helicopter. All other selections are at their default values. The 




Figure 14.   Pirates Weapons 
f. Helicopter 
The helicopter squad consists of one agent. The agent’s personality 
weightings and different trigger states are shown in Figure 15. The helicopter, after 
release from the warship, has a propensity to move towards the pirates (the Enemies and 
Enemy Threat 2 weightings are set to 100 and 40, respectively). To ensure that the 
helicopter will not be hit by friendly or enemy fire, the Easy Going and Concealment 
weightings have been set to 100. All other selections are at default values. 
The state that is used for the helicopter, other than the default, is Released 




Figure 15.   Helicopter Squad Properties 
The helicopter has only one weapon. It is set to fire at a range of 250, 200, 
and 100 meters, with an assigned probability of 0.3, 0.5, and 1, respectively. It represents 
pirate deterrence. In the Protect Contact Type box, Self and Other Friends are selected to 
prevent the helicopter from firing against itself, the warship, or the merchant ships. All 
other selections are at their default values. The helicopter’s weapon adjustments are 




Figure 16.   Helicopter Weapons 
g. Fishermen 
The fishermen squad motion does not influence the development of the 
scenario. The agent’s personality weightings are shown in Figure 17. The Next Waypoint 
weighting is set to 20 to represent the traffic in the IRTC. 
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Figure 17.   Fishermen Squad Properties 
h. Stop Conditions 
The Stop Conditions menu in MANA contains several ways to terminate a 
run, namely, having either agent reach his waypoints or specifying the number of losses 
sustained by one side, or both. These settings are found on MANA’s pull-down Setup 
menu on the Stop Conditions screen. A scenario terminates, as shown in Figure 18, when 
the red or blue squads have one loss or when the merchant’s ships (Squad 2) reach the 
waypoint. Where the number of pirates is greater than one, the stop conditions for the red 
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IV. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS (DOE) 
A. DATA FARMING 
One tool used in this project is data farming. Data farming can be combined with 
the use of distillation models like MANA to explore a more complete landscape, i.e., 
more possible system outcomes, than merely trying to answer our problem (Horne & 
Schwierz, Data farming around the world overview, 2008). 
Any model can be explored using data farming, but the use of distillations has the 
advantage that the model can be developed in a very short time, from a few minutes to 
hours or days. Once a model has been developed, high-performance computing (HPC), in 
combination with one of several existing DOE’s, can be used, and a huge sample space 
can be efficiently and rapidly explored. Simulations are run thousands of times while the 
input parameters are varied across a wide value space. 
The idea behind this technique is that it provides better insight into the question 
and reveals potential surprises, both positive and negative, that can lead to better-
informed decisions (Horne & Meyer, Data farming: discovering surprise, 2004), (Horne 
& Schwierz, Data farming around the world overview, 2008). 
B. DESIGN FACTORS 
In a design, it is fundamental to identify all the factors that are expected to affect 
the system response. The factors involved here are classified as decision, noise, or 
artificial factors. Decision, or controllable, factors are those we can control in the real 
world, while noise, or uncontrollable, factors are those we cannot readily control in real 
life, or only at great expense. Finally, artificial factors are those that come from the 
simulation itself, e.g., the initial state of the system, the warm-up period, or terminal 
conditions (Sanchez S. M., Robust design: seeking the best of all possible worlds, 2000). 
1. Decision Factors 
The following factors have been chosen as controllable factors: 
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a. Warship Position 
This is a categorical variable with three levels for the position of the 
warship in reference to the merchant ships: ―behind‖ (indicated as 1), ―on their 
sides/flanks‖ (indicated as 2), and ―in front‖ (indicated as 3). 
b. Convoy Speed 
This is a continuous variable, sampled in discrete values, for the normal 
traveling speed of the convoy (warship and merchants). It is varied between 10 and 20 
knots. 
c. Number of Merchant Ships 
This is a discrete variable for the number of merchant ships in the convoy. 
It is varied between 10 and 30. 
d. Distance Between Merchant Ships 
This is a continuous variable, sampled in discrete values, for the distance 
between merchant ships while in transit. It is varied between 50 and 500 meters. 
e. Helo Take Off Delay 
This is a continuous variable, sampled in discrete values, for the time it 
takes the helicopter to lift off after the warship becomes aware of the pirates, whether 
alerted by its own sensors or a merchant ship’s. It is varied between 15 and 60 minutes. 
2. Noise Factors 
The following factors have been chosen as uncontrollable factors: 
a. Number of Pirates 
This is a discrete variable for the number of the pirates that can attack the 
convoy. It is varied between 1 and 4. 
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b. Communication Latency Between Merchant Ships and Warship 
This is a continuous variable, sampled in discrete values, for the latency in 
communication between the merchant ship under attack and the warship. It is varied 
between 1 and 10 minutes. 
c. Pirates Speed 
This is a continuous variable, sampled in discrete values, for the speed of 
pirate vessels. It is varied between 25 and 45 knots. 
d. Distance from Convoy That Pirates Reveal Identity 
This is a continuous variable, sampled in discrete values, for the distance 
from the merchant ships at which the pirates reveal their identity and increase speed. It is 
varied between 3000 and 5500 meters. 
C. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 
The ultimate purpose of a simulation model is to gain insight into questions. With 
a well-designed experiment, the analyst is able to explore more factors than would 
otherwise have been possible by using DOE techniques developed specifically for 
analyzing high-dimensional computational models (Sanchez, Lucas, Sanchez, Nannini, & 
Wan, forthcoming). 
Which DOE is suitable? Although many designs are available, the choice involves 
several issues, such as the complexity of the response, the time required for the 
simulation to run, and the ease of changing the parameter values (Kleijnen, Sanchez, 
Lucas, & Cioppa, 2005). 
One possibility is the classical full-factorial (or gridded) design. Full-factorial 
designs are orthogonal designs in which the pairwise correlation between any two 
columns is zero. Though full-factorial designs examine all the possible combinations of 
factor levels, nevertheless, for studies involving a moderate or large number of factors, 
they are extremely large, and thus unmanageable. (Vieira, Sanchez, Kienitz, & 
Belderrain, 2011) 
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Another possible design is the fractional-factorial design, which can cover only 
two (2
k 
factorial design) or more (m
k
 factorial design) levels of each factor. They are also 
orthogonal designs and they let us examine more than one factor at a time. Additionally, 
for the later designs, the larger the value of m, the better space-filling it has. However, 
fractional-factorial designs are inefficient when k is large (Sanchez S. M., Better than a 
petaflop: the power of efficient experimental design, 2008). 
A third option for experimental design is the Latin hypercube (LH). LHs have 
good space-filling properties, like m
k
 factorial designs, but require fewer samples. Unlike 
the 2
k
 factorial, they also provide information about what is happening in the center of the 
experimental region (Sanchez S. M., Better than a petaflop: the power of efficient 
experimental design, 2008). 
Finally, Cioppa and Lucas (2007) introduced Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
(NOLH) designs. These designs have nearly orthogonal properties (pairwise correlations 
less than 0.05), good space-filling, and can accommodate a large number of factors. A 
design that is nearly orthogonal will not suffer effects due to adverse/multicollineatity 
(Montgomery, Peck, and Vining, Introduction to linear regression analysis, 2006). 
NOLHs deal better with continuous factors; rounding in order to accommodate discrete 
factors has a result of increasing correlation and thus losing some of the nearly 
orthogonal properties (Sanchez S. M., Better than a petaflop: the power of efficient 
experimental design, 2008). Figure 19 shows the space-filling of selected designs. 
 
Figure 19.   Scatterplot Matrices for Selected Factorial and NOHL Designs. (From 
Sanchez, 2008) 
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D. NEARLY ORTHOGONAL NEARLY BALANCED MIXED DESIGN 
For this study, the NONBMD is used. NONBMD developed by Hélcio Vieira 
(2010) for his PhD (Figure 20), are designs suitable for dealing with a combination of 
continuous, categorical, and discrete factors. The design is ―nearly orthogonal‖ and 
―nearly balanced,‖ which means that the absolute value of the maximum pairwise 
correlation is less than 0.05, and that it samples factors with different numbers of levels 
in a balanced manner (Vieira, Sanchez, Kienitz, & Belderrain, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 20.   Snapshot of the Nearly Orthogonal, Nearly Balanced, Design Creator  
For this analysis, two separate designs were created, one for decision factors and 
one for noise. The first design provides 51 design points (DP), while the second provides 
forty-two (Figure 21). A design point is a unique combination of input factors. 
 34 
 
Figure 21.   Screen Shots of the Separate Designs for Decision and Noise Factors. The 
display shows the decision factors, the noise factors, ranges, levels, and factor 
classification.  
Both the decision and noises factors, as shown in Figure 22, have good space-
filling properties while the maximum pairwise correlations are 0.0016 and zero, 
respectively. 
 
D D D D D N N N
CAT D D D D D D D D
warshipPosition convoy speed # of merchants distance between merchants helo take off delay # of pirates com latency between warship-merchants pirate speed distance
Ahead-back-side 10-20 (discrete) 10 - 30 (discrete) 50-500 (cont) 15-60 (cont) 1-4 (discrete) 1-10 (discrete) 25-45 (discrete) 3500-5500 (discrete)
HIGHER 3 20 30 500 60 4 10 45 5500
LOWER 1 10 10 50 15 1 1 25 3500
UNITS 1 2 1 10 1 1 1 1 500
# LEVELS 3 6 21 46 46 4 10 21 4
warshipPosition convoy speed # of merchants distance between merchants helo take off delay # of pirates com latency between warship-merchants pirate speed Distance
3 20 28 130 23 1 7 26 5500
3 16 16 210 31 3 5 26 5000
3 20 30 120 22 2 10 27 5000
1 18 15 340 35 4 10 27 5500
3 20 19 420 21 3 3 28 4500
1 12 16 300 33 2 5 28 4500
2 16 15 270 36 4 9 29 4500
3 10 26 110 48 2 2 29 4500
1 12 27 200 30 3 9 30 4000
2 18 14 330 59 2 3 30 4000
1 18 14 100 53 2 4 31 4500
2 18 29 320 42 3 3 31 4000
2 20 20 230 47 4 10 32 4000
2 20 26 370 38 1 8 32 4000
1 20 13 80 55 1 7 33 4000
2 18 13 70 18 3 6 33 3500
3 16 17 80 32 4 2 34 4000
3 12 25 470 50 1 2 34 5000
1 12 29 190 49 3 6 35 3500
2 10 13 350 17 2 6 35 5500
DECISION DESIGN NOISE DESIGN
MAX PAIRWISE CORRELATION = 0.16% ORTHOGONAL
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Figure 22.   Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Decision Factors (left) and Noise Factors 
(right). 
 Next, the two separate designs are crossed using a ruby program, creating a total 
of 2142 DP (51 x 42). The crossed design has also maximum correlation 0.0016 and good 
space-filling, as shown in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23.   Pairwise Correlation Matrix for the Crossed Design. 
Finally, the experiment was executed on the Simulation Experiments and 
Efficient Design (SEED) Center’s high-performance cluster, ―Reaper.‖ A hundred and 
fifty replications of each DP were performed for data farming, yielding a total number of 
321,300 simulated convoy operations. The xstudy, OldMcData, and Condor software 
packages were used to generate the required files and manage the execution of the 
distributed jobs (see http://harvest.nps.edu). Since each replication completed very 
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quickly (in seconds), this experimental design took only a little more than five hours to 
complete, much less time than it would take to run the same scenario in traditional full-
factorial design or 2
m
 design (Figure 24). 
 
 
Figure 24.   Comparison Plot for the Time Acquired for the Experiment to Run 
E. ROBUST DESIGN 
Robust design is a technique that combines Taguchi’s philosophy and strategy on 
improving product performance (1980) and response-surface metamodeling. The use of 
robust designs and analysis may lead to decisions based not only on a mean system’s 
performance, but also on the variance of its performance. Specifically, the system’s 
performance must be acceptable and relatively insensitive to uncontrollable sources that 
may increase its variance (Sanchez S. M., Robust design: seeking the best of all possible 
worlds, 2000). 
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As mentioned, classifying design factors into decision or noise is fundamental. In 
robust design, this classification is important for the analyst to identify design points that 
yield a good performance of a system across the range of all noise factors (Sanchez S. 
M., Better than a petaflop: the power of efficient experimental design, 2008). 
The analyst specifies a target value τ and evaluates the performance of an MOE 
compared to that value. This is achieved by the use of a loss function such as a quadratic, 
inverted normal, or truncated quadratic. In this thesis, a quadratic loss function is 
evaluated to minimize blue-squad casualties. The benefits of the quadratic loss function 
are that it is easy to manipulate mathematically and that it is a kind of loss function used 
in many other statistical applications, like regression. 
Evaluating a robust design may yield beneficial results for the system 
performance under examination. First, the system may perform well across a range of all 
noise factors, resulting in fewer surprises when moving from simulation to real life 
implementation. Another benefit is improved communication between analyst and client 
by the use of the expected loss. Finally, robust designs facilitate continuous improvement 
and lead to better decisions (Sanchez S. M., Robust design: seeking the best of all 
possible worlds, 2000). 
Having crossed the decision design with the noise design, we have created a 
design that serves well the purpose of robust analysis and we focus our attention on blue 
casualties (blueCas), with the goal of minimizing them. 
First, we introduced the raw data from 321,300 runs of MANA in JMP. We have 
specified the target value τ equal to zero blue casualties, and then created a new column 
for the loss, making use of the quadratic loss function: ℓ (blueCas) = (blueCas – τ) 2. 
Finally, we summarized over the noise factors, calculating the mean loss and the mean 
and standard deviation of the response blueCas. 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS / INTERACTION PLOTS: ALL 
FACTORS 
Multiple-regression analysis is a common statistical technique for exploring and 
modeling the relationships between various factors, called predictor or regressor 
variables, and a response variable (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2006). Various 
statistical packages are available to facilitate regression analysis. JMP Statistical 
Discovery Software version 9.0.0 is used for this work. 
The coefficient of determination, R-squared, is a popular way to assess the overall 
adequacy of a model. R-squared shows the proportion of the total variation of the 
response variable that is explained by the model. It takes values between zero and one, 
with the higher R-squared values (closer to one) being more desirable. However, R-
squared never decreases, even when an independent variable is statistically insignificant. 
Therefore, an analyst must always be aware that using R-squared may result in an over-
fitted model. 
To avoid over-fitting, a better statistic for the overall adequacy of a model is the 
adjusted R-squared. The difference between R-squared and adjusted R-squared is that the 
former can go down if statistically insignificant predictors are entered into a model 
(Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2006). 
Once the regression model is created, an adequacy check should be performed. 
The four major assumptions made about the residuals/errors are the following: 
 They have mean zero. 
 They have constant variance. 
 All errors are independent. 
 All errors are normally distributed. 
The above assumptions can be abbreviated as ε ~ NID (0, σ2) (Montgomery, Design and 




variety of tools for resolving the issue. For example, transformations or other advanced 
techniques can be used if normality assumptions are violated. (Montgomery, Peck, & 
Vining, Introduction to linear regression analysis, 2006) 
The plots and models were generated using JMP. We first imported 321,300 rows 
of raw data, indicated in the previous chapter, in JMP. Next, we created a summary data 
table with all independent variables by averaging responses of the two MOEs, mean blue 
casualties and mean red casualties, across the 150 runs of each DP. This new data table 
contained 2,142 rows. 
Analyzing the distribution for the mean blue casualties we see that the majority of 
the output is zero casualties with a mean of 0.175 and standard deviation of 0.18, with 
maximum casualties of 0.78, as shown in Figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25.   Distribution for the Mean Blue Casualties  
The process for creating the regression model consisted of a forward Bayesian 
information-criterion (BIC) stepwise technique. We allowed main effects, two-way 
interactions, and second-order polynomial terms into the model. We examined the 
stepwise-regression step history in order to see the ―knee in the curve‖ of R-squared as 
new terms were added to the model. We used this information to guide us in final 
selection of our regression model. As Figure 26 indicates, we quickly reach a point where 





Figure 26.   R-Squared Values of the Fitted Model for Mean Blue Casualties  
Figure 27 displays the actual value by predicted plot and summary data for the 
final model. This model, consisting of 13 terms, including the intercept, explains almost 
94% of the variance within the model. For that model, the adjusted R-squared is 0.93596. 
 


























To check the adequacy of the model, we examined whether the four assumptions 
for the residuals hold. First, the independence assumption holds because we used 
different random-number seeds. The mean zero and constant variance assumptions are 
also satisfied, as shown in Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 28.   Residual by Row Plot 
The only assumption that is not met is the normality of the errors, as indicated in 
Figure 29. The histogram looks fine, but the normal quantile plot and the goodness of fit 
test justify the rejection of normality. One reason for this rejection is that we are dealing 
with proportions and are limited to more zeros than ones. Asymptotically, we expect our 
distribution to be closer to normal. 
 
 
Figure 29.   Distribution of the Residuals for the Fitted Model 
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To address the violation of the normality assumption, different data 
transformations, including log, logit, exponential, and Box-Cox were used. None was 
successful, because normality tests are sensitive to outliers, and also because we are 
dealing with bounded values (0,1) and a majority of our data is zero (no casualties). 
Nevertheless, the histogram and the normal quantile plot of exponential transformation 
looked quite normal (Figure 30). 
 
 
Figure 30.   Distribution of the Residuals for the Exponential Transformed Fitted 
Model 
Again, our process for creating the regression model consisted of a forward BIC 
stepwise technique followed by standard least-squares regression. Into the model we 
allowed main effects and two-way interactions. We examined the stepwise-regression 
step history to see the knee in the curve of R-squared as new terms were added to the 
model. We used this information to guide us in final selection of a regression model. As 
Figure 31 indicates, we reach a point where adding statistically significant terms has 




Figure 31.   R-Squared Values of the Exponential Transformed Fitted Model for Mean 
Blue Casualties 
Figure 32 displays the actual by predicted plot and summary data for the final 
model. This model consists of 19 terms, including the intercept, and explains more than 
90% of the variance within the model. For this model, the adjusted R-squared is 
0.902532. 
 
























Preferred model contains 
nineteen terms
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Figure 33 displays the set of parameter estimates and prediction profiler. The top 
two influential factors are number of pirates and pirate speed. Both estimates are positive, 
indicating that they yield greater blue casualties. On the other hand, the third most 
important regressor is convoy speed, which is negative. Thus, increasing convoy speed 
results in fewer blue casualties. 
We also note that a lesser, but still significant, factor is the number of merchant 
ships. Increasing the number of merchants leads to an increase in blue casualties. 
 
Figure 33.   Parameter Estimates and Prediction Profiler for Final Fitted Model 
Figure 34 displays the interaction profiler generated by JMP. In this plot, the y-
axis represents the mean blue-casualties value. Strong interactions are seen as highly 
nonparallel lines in interaction plots. Here, the strongest interaction occurs between the 
convoy speed and number of pirates. In this case, increasing the number of pirates has 
great effect on increasing blue casualties when the convoy speed is low. We can also note 
that the warship can adequately handle the case where there is only one pirate, 
independent of convoy speed. 
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Finally, a significant interaction occurs between the number of pirates and the 
number of merchant ships. When the number of pirates increases, the blue casualties are 
greater with an increasing number of merchant ships. Again, it is important to note that in 
the case of one pirate, the blue casualties are independent from the number of merchants. 
 
Figure 34.   Interaction Profiler for Final Fitted Model of Mean Blue Casualties  
B. CLASSIFICATION AND REGRESSION TREES 
The use of classification and regression (or partition) trees (CART) is an easy way 
to quickly look at the data and gather the important relationships between factors and 
responses. We call the procedure ―classification‖ when the response variable is discrete 
and ―regression‖ when the response variable is continuous. CART is a partitioning of the 
data that occurs consecutively according to the optimal splitting value determined from 
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all possible values of each variable. The pictorial representation of the CART is an 
upside-down tree with the root at the top, with branches and leaves below (Montgomery, 
Peck, & Vining, 2006). 
Figure 35 displays a recursive split of mean blue casualties over all decision and 
noise factors. As partitioning of the data proceeds, the most significant factors and split 
values produce the leaves of the tree. The splitting point for each factor may suggest a 
lower or upper limit. Each box includes the number of data points in the split, as well as 
the mean and the standard deviation of the blue casualties. In this particular tree, we 
chose to stop at nine splits, yielding a partition tree model that explains almost 85% of 
observed variability. 
 
Figure 35.   Partition Tree for Mean Blue Casualties 
The first split is made on the number of pirates. This is the most significant factor 
in the scenario. The optimal split point is at the value of three pirates and any number 
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smaller than that can be expected to result in significantly fewer blue casualties. The next 
split is in the merchant-sensor range, which is the second most significant factor. A 
merchant-sensor range equal or greater to 4,000 m results in fewer blue casualties. The 
third split occurs in convoy speed, where a speed greater or equal to 14 knots results in 
fewer blue casualties. The fourth split is pirate speed. A speed less than 39 knots results 
in fewer blue casualties. We finally note that when the number of pirates in the scenario 
is greater or equal to four, then a number of merchant ships less or equal to 14 provides 
better protection. 
C. ROBUST ANALYSIS 
We first defined our target value τ to be equal to zero blue casualties. We then 
created a new column for the loss, making use of the quadratic loss function: ℓ (blueCas) 
= (blueCas – τ) 2. Finally, we summarized over the noise factors, calculating the mean 
loss and mean and standard deviation of the response blueCas. This new data table 
contained fifty-one rows. 
We first examine the partition tree over the mean loss, displayed in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36.   Partition Tree for the Mean Loss 
The first split of the data occurs in the convoy speed, where convoy speed greater 
or equal to 18 knots yields better results in the protection of the merchant ships. The 
second most significant factor is the number of merchant ships in the convoy. Fewer than 
14 merchant ships results in a lower number of blue casualties than if the number of 
merchants is greater than or equal to 14. The third split is made on warship position, 
which is the third most important factor for the robust analysis. A position on the flanks 
or in front of the convoy results in fewer blue casualties; sailing behind the convoy 
results in greater blue casualties. 
Analyzing the data for the mean loss, we see that the distribution is quite normal 
with a mean of 0.176 and standard deviation of 0.067, with maximum loss of 0.31, as 




Figure 37.   Distribution for the Mean Loss 
For the robust analysis, a regression model was created. The process for creating 
the regression model consisted of a forward BIC stepwise technique followed by standard 
least-squares regression. Into the model we allowed main effects, two-way interactions, 
and second-order polynomial terms. We examined the stepwise-regression step history in 



























In contrast to what we saw above in the analysis of the residuals for the whole 
model, the analysis of the residuals here indicates that all four assumptions are satisfied. 
As shown in Figure 39, the residuals pass the normality test. 
 
 
Figure 39.   Distribution of the Residuals for the Mean Loss  
Figure 40 displays the actual value by predicted plot and summary data for the 
final model. This model, consisting of 13 terms, including the intercept, explains more 





Figure 40.   Fitted Model for Mean Loss  
Figure 41 displays the set of parameter estimates and the prediction profiler. The 
top two influential factors are convoy speed and number of merchants. The convoy speed 
parameter is negative, indicating that it yields lower mean loss, while the number of 
merchants is positive, indicating greater mean loss. 
 
Figure 41.   Parameter Estimates and Prediction Profiler for Final Fitted Model  
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Figure 42 displays the interaction profiler generated by JMP. In this plot, the y-
axis represents the mean loss value. Here, the strongest interaction occurs between 
convoy speed and the number of merchant ships. In this case, increasing the number of 
merchants has great effect on increasing the mean loss when the convoy speed is high. 
 
 
Figure 42.   Interaction Profiler for Final Fitted Model of Mean Blue Casualties 
D. PARALLEL PLOTS 
Parallel plots provide a visual representation of the interaction between the 
variables. In Figure 43, 2,142 lines connect the response variable with 2,142 DPs. Traces 
associated with the higher- and lower mean blue casualties are highlighted with red and 
blue solid lines, respectively. Translating the insights of the parallel plot in the context of 
the scenario, positioning the warship in front of the convoy results in the lowest mean 
blue casualties, whereas placing it behind of the convoy results in the highest mean blue 
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casualties. As stated earlier in the regression analysis, however, the position of the ship is 
not a significant factor of the model. This result is reinforced with the parallel plot, since 
the position of the warship in front of the convoy results in some of the highest mean blue 
casualties as well. Moreover, the position of the warship behind the convoy yields some 
of the lowest mean blue casualties. 
An important takeaway from the parallel plot, which reinforces the results from 
the regression analysis, is that the number of pirates is a significant factor. The higher the 
number of pirates, the higher the mean blue casualties is. 
Finally, pirate speed is another significant factor of the model, since high pirate 
speed results in high blue casualties and low pirate speed results in low blue casualties. 
 
Figure 43.   Parallel Plot for Mean Blue Casualties  
For the robust analysis, 51 lines representing the 51 design points are shown in 
Figure 44. The plot indicates that high convoy speed yields low mean loss, while low 



























A. ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
This research set out to determine how well an escorting warship can protect a 
convoy of merchant ships while handling pirate attacks. In addition, we tried to answer 
how many merchant ships a warship can adequately protect and what formation (speed, 
distance, position of the warship) the convoy should follow to safely travel through the 
IRTC. 
This study mainly uses three analysis techniques to look at the mean merchant 
(blue) casualties: multiple-regression analysis, robust analysis, and classification and 
regression trees based on over 300,000 simulated convoy missions. 
The three analyses complement each other. Each analysis identifies similar factors 
of greatest importance and key interactions and provides similar insights. Moreover, the 
regression analysis yields a formula for predicting mean merchant casualties and insight 
into the significant factors of the scenario. The three most influential factors are the 
number of pirates, pirate speed, and convoy speed. Additionally, the regression analysis 
reveals some interesting interactions between the important factors. Increasing the 
number of pirates has great effect on increasing blue casualties when the convoy speed is 
low. Another significant interaction occurs between the number of pirates and the number 
of merchant ships. When the number of pirates increases, blue casualties are greater for 
increasing numbers of merchant ships. Finally, the regression notes that the warship can 
adequately handle the case where there is only one pirate, independent of convoy speed, 
and that increasing the number of merchants leads to an increase in blue casualties. 
For the robust analysis, a regression model was also created, providing a 
prediction formula based on the decision factors of the scenario only. The two most 
influential factors are convoy speed and number of merchant ships. The interaction that 
occurs between the convoy speed and the number of merchant ships indicates that 
increasing the number of merchants has great effect on increasing the mean loss when the 
convoy speed is high. 
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Two separate classification and regression trees were conducted: one for the 
robust analysis over decision factors and one over the whole number of scenario factors. 
The first CART indicates that a convoy speed greater than or equal to 18 knots and a 
number of merchant ships in the convoy less than 14 yields better results in the protection 
of the convoy. Also, positioning the warship on the flanks or in front of the convoy 
results in fewer merchant casualties, whereas a position behind the convoy results in 
greater merchant casualties. The second CART indicates that the most significant factor 
of the scenario is the number of pirates. Three pirates or fewer can be expected to result 
in significantly fewer merchant casualties. Two other important takeaways from the later 
CART are the merchant sensor range and convoy speed, where values equal to or greater 
than 4,000 m and 14 knots, respectively, result in fewer merchant casualties. Finally, a 
pirate speed of less than 39 knots results in fewer merchant casualties than a pirate speed 
greater or equal to 39 knots. 
B. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
This thesis provides many opportunities for follow-on research: 
 The scenario may be expanded using more than one escort warship or 
Unmanned, Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to patrol over the convoy for the 
whole or part of the trip. 
 The scenario may also include other MOEs, such as the time it takes for 
the warship to interdict the pirates. 
 Finally, the scenario may be expanded to a higher level of detail. It may 
include the time it takes the warship or helicopter to stop and arrest the 
pirates or the actual self-protection measures the merchants may take to 
deter or delay the attack, like razor-wire barriers or water, spray, and foam 
monitors. 
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